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AN ADVERSARUU.. QUAGMIRE
THE CONTINUED INABILITY OF THE QUEENSLAND CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM TO CATER FOR INDIGENOUS WITNESSES
AND COMPLAINANTS
by Nigel Stobbs
INnmmJCTION
In the recent case ofR v Hlatt 1 (,Hlatt') the President of
the Queensland Court ofAppeal said that
[t]he application of the Rule of Law in Queeflsland depends not
only on the right of an accused person to a fair trial according
to law but also on victims of alleged crimes having a genuine
opportunity to make a complaint and to give evidence about
it.2
The President went on to add that there is a strong
obligation to do 'everything practicable' to ensure that
Indigenous complainants who do not speak English have
this basic access. Despite this welcome reaffirmation by
the President that the Rule of Law applies equally to
Indigenous Australians, the release ofa number ofreports
and the enactment of a number of legislative safeguards
in relation to Indigenous witnesses, the reality seems to
be that little of substance has been done to address the
systemic biases which confront Indigenous complainants
and witnesses for whom English is not the primary
language. Certainly, the 18-year-old Aboriginal woman
who was the complainant in Watt, who had reported
multiple violent rapes over a 14-hour period, may well
dispute that any purported reconciling of linguistic
and cultural differences provided her any real means
of redress when the Court of Appeal overturned the
convictions against her alleged attacker on the grounds
that her testimony, given through an interpreter, was
'unreliable' .
In terms of the respective versions of events of the
complainant and accused in Hlatt, and of the evidence
to be considered by the jury, this ought to have been
a relatively straightforward trial. But due to confusion
over the statements ofthe complainant while under oath,
which seem to be a paradigm example of cross-cultural
communication problems, the trial appears to have been
grossly unfair to both the accused and (especially) the
complainant.
The complainant in this case gave evidence3 that she was
forced to have sex with the defendant three times on the
evening of20 July 2005 and then again on the morning
of 21 July 2005. The defendant had been charged with
three counts of rape and one count of deprivation of
liberty for detaining the complainant against her will
over this period. The defendant's version of events was
that he had heard on 20 July that his sister had died and,
realising that he would be unable to attend her funeral,
spent the day at the pub. He said he met the complainant
(a former girlfriend) on the road while walking home and
that she had consented to staying with him at his sister's
house and to having sex.
The complainant's version of events was very different
and 'internally inconsistent' due (the Court of Appeal
suspects)4 to language and cultural barriers posed by the
adversarial nature of the trial process.
At trial, the defendant was to answer four charges:
Count 1: Rape - which was alleged to have taken place
at a Telstra communications tower..
Count 2: Rape - which was alleged to have taken place
in the grounds of a local school.
Count 3: Rape - which was alleged to have taken
place at the defendant's sister's house in the
morning.
Count 4: Deprivation of liberty - from the time that
the complainant was first apprehended by the
defendant up until the time she was found by
police.
The complainant's language was Wik Mungkan and
she did not speak English. She also had a hearing
impediment. An interpreter (who had qualifications in
linguistics) was provided for the complainant in giving
her evidence. The trial and appeal judges noted that the
National Accreditation Authority for Translators and
Interpreters ('NAATI') has not been able tQ accredit any
WikMungkan interpreters to the levelnormally expected
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of court interpreters. 5 According to the defendant's
barrister in the trial, the complainant was at a further
linguistic disadvantage due to the fact that the version of
Wik Mungkan the interpreter speaks is 'richer' than that
used by the younger generation ofWikM ungkan speakers
(including the complainant) who tend to supplement their
speech with English words and phrases.
Defence counsel: Okay. Did you and [the defendant] sit
down at the tower?
Witness: He said to have sex.
Defence counsel: Did [the defendant] ask you to have sex
with him?
Witness: I'm saying honestly that he raped melO
Witness: No.
[lunch adjournment then the following.]
In fact the defendant at no stage gave evidence that he and
the complainant had sex on that morning. The Court of
Appeal therefore also overturned the conviction for the
final rape charge due to this error.
Unfortunately, the trial judge seems to have also been
confused by the various inconsistencies in the evidence
and testimony. She stated in her summing up to the
JUry:
He [the defendantJ said that when they got to the sister's place
he was no longer holding onto her, that he spoke to his sister
and ... thatthe next morning he got up and had breakfast, went
back in the bedroom, they [the defendant and the complainantJ
had had sex together and he went to sleep and when he woke
up [the complainant] was no longer there and that's when the
police arrived.
It is hard to avoid the conclusion that the complainant in
this case has been denied the opportunity to make a proper
and competent complaint about what may well have been
a harrowing and traumatising experience, simply because
the justice system has not done what McMurdo Prefers
to as 'everything practicable' to provide basic access to
justice for Indigenous people who do not speak English.
If allowed to tell her story in her own language and in
a less intimidating and alienating context, perhaps as a
narrative of the events according to her recollection, the
complainant may well have avoided the inconsistencies
which doomed her case. The fact that at a late stage she
responds to the defence counsel's repeated questions
about whether she had sexwith the defendant on different
The defendant was convicted ofthe rape charge in relation
to the events at the house on the following morning and
the deprivation of-liberty charge. The Court of Appeal,
quite rightly, overturned the conviction for deprivation
of liberty as the charge was framed in terms of the
complainant being detained against her will for the whole
of the period during which the four rapes were alleged.
The defendant was subsequently acquitted of the rape
charges in relation to what allegedly occurred at the
tower and at the school grounds. It seems likely that these
acquittals were the result ofthe sorts ofinconsistencies in
the trial evidence of the complainant as illustrated above.
Do you think she understands the
timeframe [interpreter]?
I'm not sure what the-I think we're back
with the problem we had with the first
questions.
Interpreter:
Witness:
Interpreter: She wants to ,90 from the start of the
story.
What are you saying about the tower?
And who took me?
Defence counsel: Okay, did you have sex with [the
defendantJ at the tower?
Judge:
Defence counsel: Did you go to the tower with [the
defendantJ?
Interpreter: She's saying, "What?"
Defence counsel: Did you and [thedefendantJ walk to the
tower together?
On the basis of this and other exchanges between the
interpreter, the judge and the barristers in the trial it
appears highly likely that the reason that the complainant
appeared to contradict herself regarding a number of
critical issues during the trial was due to this cultural
phenomenon and what the interpreter referred to as
'the context in the court'.7 In fact the interpreter asserts
that the complainant had done exactly the same thing in
the committal proceedings.s At one stage in the trial the
following exchange took place:
Defence counsel: Okay, you and [the defendant] went to
the tower?9
There was no suggestion that the complainant's conflicting
responses indicated an attempt at deception, rather, they
were due to a lack ofunderstanding ofthe adversarial trial
procedure and differences in communications dynamics.
At one point during the trial, the interpreter interjected
and, with leave, made the following comments to the
judge:
[ltJ is a cultural background thing that you speak 'yes' to the
person who is for you and 'no' to the person who is against
you, regardless of what is involved, and I don't know-I've tried
to explain that you're doing it - answering the question, you're
not - it's not something to the person, without success.6
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occasions by simply stating 'I'm saying honestly that he
raped me' indicates that she is able and willing to deliver
a coherent narrative. In this case the jury seems to have
made an assessment that the complainant was credible
(since the defendant was initially convicted of the final
rape charge), but she has lost her opportunity for redress
as a matter of[aw.
FORMAL OBLIGATiONS TO CATER
fOR INDIGENOUS WnTNESSIES AND
CiOMPUUNANTS
There is little doubt that the criminal courts have evolved
to suit the needs of the judges and the lawyer advocates.
ratherthan the litigants (or the witnesses) for whose benefit
they ought to exist. An adversarial criminal court operates
on the assumption that all complainants and witnesses
have an equal procedural right to make complaints and
to give evidence. I would go further and assert that this is
a right which requires substantive equality. The potential
for substantive inequality in the case ofthose who are not
speakers ofEnglish is obvious given the complexity ofthe
rules relating to procedure and evidence and the adversarial
nature of criminal proceedings. ll
Although there is no statutory or common law right to
an interpreter for a'complainant, a witness, or an accused
person in Queensland, trial judges do have discretion to
order that an interpreter be provided by the State.12
The conduct ofthe criminal trial which was examined by
the Court ofAppeal in VVcltt is surely a clear and significant
case ofsystemic discrimination preventing the complainant
from exercising these rights and her fundamental right
to (in the words of McMurdo P) 'make a complaint
and give evidence about it'. Despite the fact that the
Commonwealth Government did not support adoption
ofthe United Nations Declaration on the Rights c!fIndigenous
Peoples, 13 the rights in relation to protection from systemic
discrimination which it contains have all long been
entrenched both in existing instruments of international
law (to whichAustralia certainly is a signatory) and in extant
legislation and common law in Australia. 14
A 1996 Queensland CriminalJustice Commission (,CJC')
Report on Aboriginal witnesses 15 made a number of
practical recommendations about changes to the way
that Aboriginal complainants and witnesses were to be
treated by the criminal justice system. Recommendation
4.1 of that report suggested that the Evidence Act 1977
(Qld) be amended to allow a witness in a criminal trial to
give their evidence-in-chiefwholly or partly in narrative
form. Section 21 (2) (e) ofthe Act now gives the court the
power to make an order or direction about the giving of
evidence by a special witness. There is nothing to suggest
that this statutory discretion precludes a direction that a
witness be able to give evidence in narrative form. In the
VVcltt trial no direction of this nature was applied for or
given and WilsonJ (in the appeal hearing) suggests that it
might have been more appropriate for the complainant's
evidence to have been pre-recorded.16 The lawyers and
the trial judge were clearly aware of the difficulties that
the complainant was encountering but by the time it
seems to have become apparent, her evidence had already
largely been given. This begs the question as to why it
only became clear so late in the criminal justice process
(after police investigation and interviewing, interViewing'
ofwitnesses by the lawyers and a committal proceeding)
that this significant disadvantage would arise.
It might be assumed that the lawyers and judge
involved were not expecting this level of confusion in
the giving of evidence by the complainant. If that is so,
it is especially disappointing considering the number
of recommendations that the CJC Report makes in
relatioR to cross-cultural awareness training of lawyers,
prosecutors, judges and policeY A 1997 report on the
status of the implementation of these recommendations
by the CJC indicates that little ofreal substance had been
done in relation to cross-cultural training. However, Susan
Kerr, a contemporary critic ofthis apparent over-reliance
on cross-cultural awareness training, commented that:
What is necessary is an examination of the appropriateness of
the adversarial and formal nature ofthese proceedings in terms
of eliciting cogent and coherent testimony from Aboriginal
witnesses. With respect to the CJC, improving cultural
awareness will not affect the kinds of procedural changes
that are necessary in ensuring that culturally disadvantaged
witnesses receive the justice that is theirdue. 18
One of the most basic recommendations of the CJC
Report, that a witness have a statutory right to an
interpreter (unless the witness can understand and speak
English sufficiently to enable the witness to understand,
and make an adequate reply to, questions that may be put),
has not been acted upon. If there were such a statutory
right, it may be that the Queensland Government would
then have an obligation to ensure that the necessary
resources were made available to train interpreters in Wik
Mungkan to the levels ordinarily required by NAATI.
In relation to proper and adequate resourcing, Justice
Wilson in the Court ofAppeal judgment states that:
Clearly there is still much to be done systemically by those
involved at all levels of the criminal trial process ... to ensure
o
C')
(])
::>
<J)
!!!.
ID
(])
E
::>
o
>
Cll
..J
'"o
o
N
Q;
.D
o
o
o
(])
.D
E
(])
0.
(])
en
Z
~
L.U
....l
....l
;:J
=$;
«
....l
V1
;:J
o
Z
L.U
l.J
Cl
Z
o
C')
(j)
::>
"'!!!.
(0
(j)
E
::>
o
>
(]J
-'
r--
o
o
(\J
Q;
.D
o
o
o
Q;
.D
E
(j)
Q.
(j)
(f)
z
i=
UJ
...J
...J
:J
ell
~
-'
If)
:J
o
Z
UJ
LJ
Cl
Z
that the complainant [in a case such as this] has a proper
and meaningful opportunity to give her evidence. And
implementation of any new procedures which may be devised
will require proper resourcing l9
Section 21 of the Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) provides that a
court may disallow questions put to a witness in cross-
examination where the court considers the question to
be improper. 'Improper'can mean a question which is
misleading or confusing, and the court is required to
consider the cultural background of the witness when
making this determination. Section 21A provides, inter
alia, that where a special witness is, as a result of their
cultural background likely to be so intimidated as to be
disadvantaged when giving evidence, the court may make
a direction that any questions put to such a witness be
kept simple. It could well be that questions such as in the
exchange set out earlier are 'improper' for the purposes
of the Evidence Act 1977 (Qld), but surely the appropriate
solution is not to simply keep asking the question or to
phrase it in a different way. The adversarial tactic of re-
asking a question and then drawing a conclusion as to the
reliability of the witness based on differing responses is
simply unfair (and possibly unethical) when the advocate
lmows that the witness is not able to respond rationally to
the adversarial process (or will respond in a way which is
culturally divergent from what ajurywill compreh~nd).
CONCLUSION
The systemic discrimination which militates against the
right of a number of Indigenous Australians to make a
fair and properly assessed complaint within the criminal
justice system in Queensland is apparent. In 2007 the
court system seems incapable ofcatering for the needs of
those who do not have the same linguistic and cultural
background of those who work within it. The defects in
the liVcltts case made it inevitable that the convictions would
be quashed and that the complainant would be left worse
off for her experience with the justice system. The most
sigIlificant problem that needs to be addressed is that these
defects were all avoidable.
Nigel Stobbs is a lecturer in criminal law and Indigenous legal
issues in the Faculty of Law at the Queensland University of
Technology ('QUT).
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